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The Arab-Israeli Confrontation:
A Historian's Analysis
C.

ERNEST DAWN*

Insistence on non-negotiable positions by both sides has been the
salient feature of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The essential point at issue
remains today what it was in the beginning, the existence of a Jewish
state in Palestine. On this question thus far, neither side has given
any unambiguous indication of willingness to compromise. Such intransigence is paralleled by a military stalemate in which neither side
has been able to force the other to accept a settlement. Finally, while
the great powers have been deeply involved in the conflict from its
inception, it has not been possible for the powers to impose a solution.
These observations may seem obvious and commonplace, but in public discussion very frequently (and at crucial times) the policies of the
governments have proceeded from their contraries. These misperceptions may not be the root cause of the Arab-Israeli impasse, but surely
their correction is the first step in the search for a solution.
Belief that cause or solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict lies outside the two parties has been a major blinder. Zionists commonly
thought that the source of their problems with the Arabs was Britain;
Arabs have attributed the existence of Israel to the British or the
Americans; Ernest Bevin, among many others, believed that the
problem could have been solved by an American president who was
willing to resist the Zionist conspiracy; it is commonly said that Israel
was created by the United Nations. In fact, neither the United Nations nor the great powers have ever imposed, or been able to impose,
their wills. The Partition Resolution of November 1947 was never
implemented, and Israel became a state under traditional international custom. United Nations actions with respect to Israel and the
Arab states, until very recently, have rarely touched basic political
questions. No United Nations action that was not acceptable to both
Arabs and Israelis has ever been implemented.
The inability of the United Nations or the great powers to impose
a solution originates partly in rivalry between the two superpowers,
but only partly. The United States and the Soviet Union have been
* Professor of History, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; B.A., University of Chattanooga (1941), M.A., Princeton (1947), Ph.D., Princeton (1948). Professor
Dawn's recent publications include FROM OTTOMANISM TO ARABISM: ESSAYS ON THE
ORGINS OF ARAB NATIONALISM (1973); Pan-Arabism and the Failureof Israeli-Jordanian
Peace Negotiations, 1950 in ISLAM AND ITS CULTURAL DIVERGENCE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
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in agreement at times, notably in 1947-49, but their agreement has
not resulted in the imposition of any measures on either Arabs or
Israelis. When the big two have been in agreement, both Arabs and
Israelis have been able to muster enough support from other states
to frustrate any outside action, whether through the United Nations
or by individual states. The underlying reality is that both Arabs and
Israelis have a long history of violent resistance to outside forces. In
the 1920s and 30s, with international consent, the British and French
imposed colonial rule on the Arabs, and the British used military
force to secure the establishment of a Jewish community in Palestine.
Since 1945, however, international conditions have made it difficult
for the European powers to use military force in a major way. At the
same time, both Arabs and Israelis have shown that they will give up
their political goals only when forced into submission. Thus, the present stage in the Arab-Israeli conflict originated when the British,
under violent attack from the Jews, unwilling to use force against the
Arabs, and unable because of international conditions to use effective
force against the Jews, withdrew and left succession to the Palestine
mandate to be decided by war between the two communities. The
British and the French attempted military action against the Arabs
in 1956, but failed in the face of American and Soviet opposition. The
Soviets, apparently, intended direct action against Israel during the
1973 war, but refrained when the United States showed opposition.
The powers accordingly have had to limit themselves to providing
assistance, financial and military, to the disputants. Both the Arab
states and Israel have enjoyed such largess in sufficient degree that
the basic balance between them has not been affected. And so the
Arab-Israeli confrontation in essence has been left at the balance
between the two sides.
It may be that the international constellation is changing to
Israel's detriment. Certainly, the Arab states enjoy a comfortable
majority in the United Nations. But it is most unlikely that General
Assembly actions will have any more effect in the future than they
have had in the past. It is easy to imagine the Security Council
imposing sanctions on Israel save for the American veto, but the veto
will be sufficient to prevent implementation. The European countries
and Japan have recently become solidly pro-Arab, as France has been
since 1967, but it is difficult to see how the new friends of the Arabs
can have any more influence on the situation than France has had,
which is no influence at all. Most of the states have limited capability
of military intervention and it is doubtful if any have the will. Israel
is, of course, thrown on the United States solely for military supply,
and the NATO countries can be expected to deny the use of their
facilities for an American resupply of Israel, but the United States
can, if it wishes, make do without European cooperation.
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The United States might change its policy, but it is doubtful that
it can take action now which will have any immediate effect. Military
action against Israel by the United States or by any other non-Arab
state is almost inconceivable. American supply of Israel could be
stopped while the Arabs continued to receive arms from abroad. In
this situation, the pressures on the American government from proIsraeli sources would be tremendous. If the government succeeded in
withstanding the pressures, Israel could, and undoubtedly would,
strike at the Arabs before the balance changed. If the Arabs should
quickly destroy Israel in war, then the United States would be able
to shed a few tears and make its peace with the Arabs. But such a
decisive Arab victory is remote, and accordingly the American government would not likely be spared the pressures which the continuing Arab-Israeli confrontation generates.
This holds true for the situation with the greatest imaginable
impact on American policy, i.e., an Arab-Israeli war with total Arab
oil boycott. Leaving aside the extremely improbable case of an immediate and decisive Arab victory, the war would result in another
localized victory for Israel or a stalemate, but in either event both
sides would need immediate resupply if hostilities were to be continued. In this situation, the Soviet Union would continue to supply the
Arabs, and the latter through a total oil boycott would attempt to
prevent the United States from resupplying Israel. The oil boycott
might cause economic collapse in Europe and Japan and would cause
great dislocation in the United States, but it would not have immediate impact on the ability of the United States to resupply Israel or,
in the worst imaginable case, to engage the Soviet Union; nor would
it lead to an immediate Arab victory, for the Arabs would need time
for resupply and the formation of new units.
In this scenario, the Israelis would fight a slow, defensive war
until they were exhausted as the Arabs gradually rebuilt their forces.
The United States and the European countries would be in agony. It
is difficult to imagine an American government withholding supplies
from Israel in this case. Indeed, even France might be driven to act.
One of the reasons the French government has been able to act as it
has since 1967 is precisely that the United States has been supplying
Israel, just as the United States government was able to avoid supplying Israel with military supplies from 1948 to 1966 precisely because
other countries, notably France, were providing them. In any event,
the relative strength of the Arabs and the Israelis, not the policies of
the powers, continues to be the dominant element.
In fact, the NATO and the Warsaw Pact powers are in nominal
agreement on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both have accepted Security
Council Resolution 242. Thus far, however, Israel will not accept any
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implementation of the resolution except one which provides for territorial acquisitions, agreed security arrangements, and Arab recognition of Israel. The Arabs, refusing to accept any one of the Israeli
desiderata, have called instead for the immediate, complete, and
unconditional withdrawal of Israel to the frontiers defined in the
General Armistice Agreements of 1949. In the face of Arab and Israeli
determination, the powers have not been able to secure the execution
of a Security Council resolution which received the votes of all permanent members of the Council.
The great powers' effective intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict has been limited to the provision of financial assistance and
military supplies to Israel and the Arab states. Neither combatant
has suffered any major deficiency, i.e., in the four wars the troops on
both sides which could be deployed have had sufficient arms and
supplies. The issue has been decided each time by the greater effectiveness of Israeli troops. Israel has had, and probably will continue
to have, the capability of defending Israel. At the same time, Israel
has not deen able to inflict a defeat on the Arabs which forces the
latter to recognize Israel. Between the wars, the Arab states have
been able to continue a state of belligerency and to rebuild their
military forces. Every indication is that this balance will continue for
some time. Outside intervention which imposes a solution on either
side is also improbable. Thus, the Arab-Israeli confrontation will continue as before unless one or the other of the contestants changes its
position on the basic issue.
Nominally, the Arab states and Israel are as far apart as ever on
the basic issue-the existence of Israel. Recently, however, the Egyptian government has taken positions that may imply the abandonment of the old line. At the same time, Egypt still expresses fidelity
to the Palestinian cause in terms which imply the traditional Arab
attitude toward Israel. Indications of change are obvious, but their
precise meaning remains uncertain.
Arabs speaking to Arabs until very recently were never ambiguous about Zionism and Israel. The Palestinian Arabs consistently
asserted that the Palestine Mandate was illegal and that those Jews
who settled in Palestine under the Mandate were unlawful trespassers. When the United Nations General Assembly was considering the
Palestine case in 1947, the Palestinian Arab Higher Executive and
the Arab governments rejected the UNSCOP minority recommendation of a federated state as well as the majority recommendation of
partition. The official Arab demand was the immediate establishment of an Arab state in the whole of Palestine. In the Arab governments' proposal to UNSCOP, which was somewhat more moderate
than the Higher Executive's position, only about one-third of the
Jewish population was guaranteed citizenship in the proposed state:
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only those Jews who had obtained Palestinian nationality were to
become citizens of the new state; illegal Jewish immigrants (as defined by the Palestine government) were to be expelled, while the
status of legal Jewish immigrants was to be determined by the future
Palestinian government.
Officially, there has been no change in the Palestinian position
since 1947. The Palestine National Charter as adopted by the Palestine National Council in 1964 (art. 7) provides "Jews of Palestinian
origin will be considered Palestinians provided they wish to live
peacefully and loyally in Palestine."' "Jews of Palestinian origin"
must be interpreted in the light of the consistently held Palestinian
position that Jewish immigration since the Balfour Declaration is
illegal. Moreover, the provision was replaced in the Charter as
amended in 1968 (art. 6), by "Jews who were normally resident in
Palestine up to the beginning of the Zionist invasion are Palestinians."' The same session of the National Council also reiterated the
Palestinian view of the mandate in a resolution which reads, "The
Council affirms, moreover, that the aggression against the Arab nation, and the territories of that nation, began with the Zionist invasion of Palestine in 1917, and that, as a consequence, 'the elimination
of the consequences of the aggression' must signify the elimination of
all such consequences since the beginning of the Zionist invasion and
'3
not merely since the 1967 war."
A change in Palestinian discussion of the future of Palestine
occurred in 1969. The largest and most important resistance organization, Fateh, gained the leading position in the Palestine Liberation
Organization, and the other guerilla groups were admitted. Under
Fateh leadership, the Palestine National Council adopted two resolutions, on February 4 and September 6, which set the Palestinian goal
as the establishment of "a free and democratic society in Palestine
for all Palestinians, including Muslims, Christians, and Jews," as the
creation of "a Palestinian democratic state . . . , free of all forms of
religious and social discrimination. 14 The Zionist state, of course,
would be eradicated. Fateh, the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine began to include the new vision of Palestine in their publications and in the statements of their leaders. Nevertheless, the new
slogan had to be handled gingerly.
1. 44

ORIENTE MODERNO 527 (1964).
2. INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES,
(1968).
3. Id. at 403.
4. Id. at 589, 779 (1969 ed.).

INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE
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Of special delicacy was the question of which Jews in Palestine
were to be considered Palestinians. Most statements issued since
1969 have passed over the question in silence. But each of the three
organizations declared that all Jews living in Palestine who would
renounce Zionism would be citizens of the new state. There is no
reason to doubt the sincerity of the three organizations, but it is also
certain that the new concept is still opposed by many. The Arab
Higher Committee, a survival from the old days, denounced the idea
of including the Jews in the future Palestine. An effort by the Popular
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine to obtain approval
from the Palestine National Council resulted in the Council's referral
of the question to the Executive Committee in June 1970. There it
remains, and the Charter of 1968 stands.
Clearly, the new leadership of the PLO has been unable to win
enthusiastic support for its conception of the Palestinian state. The
PLO leadership does feel able to espouse the idea, even to portray it
as official policy, as Yasir Arafat did when speaking to the United
Nations General Assembly on November 13, 1974. Arafat also gave
as official PLO policy the inclusion of "all Jews now living in Palestine who choose to live with us there in peace and without discrimination." Arafat was speaking to the Palestinian Arabs as well as the
General Assembly. The Arabic newspaper which is perhaps the most
widely read by Palestinians in Lebanon published the full text of
Arafat's speech and devoted its report of the speech precisely to his
description of the democratic state. It may be significant that the
report.of the speech did not include the passage concerning "all Jews
now living in Palestine," but the passage was included in the text of
the speech.
The new slogan of a democratic Palestine with equality for Jews
has not been accompanied by any systematic thought about the problems. References to the democratic state are embedded in lengthy
discourses composed of long denuciations of Zionism, imperialism,
and the United States, and of fervent affirmations that the new Palestine will be Arab in culture and, ultimately, a part of the unified
Arab state. The Palestinian Arabs who proclaim their brotherhood
with the Palestinian Jews have shown no sign that they have taken
cognizance of the problems and tragedies which have been the rule
in the modern age in states in Europe, Asia, and Africa that have
attempted state-building with populations rent by ethnic, religious,
or communal divisions.
The PLO's program of a democratic Palestinian state thus offers
a very fragile foundation for a peaceful permanent settlement of he
Arab-Israeli conflict. The program requires the renunciation of the
Zionist ideal and the merging of the Israeli Jews in an Arab national
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state. Even so, the capacity of the present PLO leadership to give
effect to the program is in doubt, since many Palestinians evidently
remain faithful to the old view that the Jews are interlopers in
Palestine. And even if the Palestinian Arabs and the Israelis should
accept the principle, it is difficult to see how the two communities
could make a better go of it than the numerous states which have
failed to weld hostile minorities into harmonious wholes.
Reconciliation between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews is
obviously not at hand. Nevertheless, the PLO's adoption of the democratic state is one faint step toward possible ultimate reconciliation.
It may be that in the long run reconciliation is impossible and that
the conflict will continue until one side or the other achieves a decisive military victory. In any event, the confrontation will continue for
some time.
Ultimately, the Palestinians are only one element in the Arab
side of the conflict. Much depends on the policies of the Arab states.
The official position of the Arab governments has never varied. Palestine is, in their view, an inalienable part of the Arab fatherland, and
Israel is an intruder. The government of Egypt, in seeking "to liquidate the consequences of the aggression," as the attempt to restore
the situation before the 1967 war is called, has embarked on a slightly
different course. Egypt accepted Security Council Resolution 242 and
set about achieving its implementation through the United Nations.
Israel insisted on a formal peace treaty which included frontier
changes and security arrangements. Egypt insisted on full Israeli
withdrawal to the General Armistice Agreements (1949) frontiers and
no major or unilateral demilitarization of Egyptian territory. In return, Egypt offered a declaration of non-belligerency, recognition of
Israel, and, upon solution of the refugee problem, free passage
through Suez and the Tiran Straits. The Egyptian offer was a radical
departure without parallel in the past. But the ability of the Egyptian
government to give effect to the policy was questionable. The offer
was made to representatives of the United Nations and of foreign
governments.
The Egyptians, however, spoke differently in Arabic. Presidents
Nasser and Sadat might occasionally speak of "peace," "treaty," and
"recognition of Israel" in interviews with American journalists, but
the Arab public learned of them only through anti-Nasserist accounts
originating in Tunis and Beirut. Egyptian statements in the Arabic
media spoke only of securing complete Israeli withdrawal from all the
occupie.d territories and of the restoration of the legitimate rights of
the Palestinians.
Since the 1973 war, Egyptian statesmen have spoken to the
Arabs in more detail concerning Resolution 242. Both President
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Sadat and Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi, in statements published
in the Arabic press, have spoken of "peace," "signing a peace treaty
with Israel," and "terminating the state of war" (so the English "belligerency" is rendered in Arabic). 5 It is difficult to interpret the statements as meaning anything other than recognition of and coexistence with Israel, and so Arab critics of Egypt have insisted. At
the same time, Egypt makes the peace dependent upon the recovery
of Palestinian rights which will be defined by the Palestinians alone.
The Egyptian government proclaims that it will sign a peace treaty
and live in peace with Israel, that Egypt has no wish to destroy Israel,
and that there is no risk to Israel in withdrawal from the occupied
territories. The Egyptian government also says that peace is dependent on the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people, which only the Palestinians will define.
Egypt's concern for Palestinian as well as Egyptian rights indicates the degree to which Arab nationalist sentiment has become
effective in Egyptian politics. It was not always so. Arabism originated in the lands to the east of Suez, and for long its goal was the
unification of this territory into a national state. Arabs did not regard
Egypt as Arab, and the Egyptians had begun to think of themselves
as Egyptians long before Arabism challenged Ottomanism anywhere.
For years, the Egyptian leaders ignored Arab nationalism.
Arab nationalism became effective in Egypt as a result of ties of
sentiment and a calculation of Egypt's own special, non-Arab interest. Calculated special interest was the more important. Arabs and
Egyptians shared a common Arabic and Islamic culture and the emotion of an injured self-view that arose from a common perception of
themselves in relation to the modern West. Consequently, Islamic
and Arab revivalism gradually spread in Egypt and became an element in internal politics by the late 1930s. But most of the Egyptian
leadership had little sentimental attachment to Arabism and a great
deal of reluctance to shoulder its burdens, notably those arising from
the Palestinian cause. If Egypt had held back, the Arabs would have
been unified by Hashimite Iraq and thus allied to Egypt's enemy,
Britain. Egypt therefore committed itself to Arab nationalism in pursuit of the great Egyptian national goal, the expulsion of Britain from
Egypt and the Sudan. As a result of the defeat in the Palestine War
of 1948-49, the Egyptian leadership was embittered at the other Arab
states, and the virtues of a return to the true Egyptian policy were
freely debated. Egypt was willing to consider de facto peace with
5. For the major Egyptian statements since 1974, see, e.g., Sadat to NEWSWEEK
in al-Akhbar, Mar. 18, 1974; Sadat to TIME in al-Ahram, Jan. 22, 1975; Sadat to the
Washington Post, in al-Ahram, Feb.18, 1975; Sadat to the Palestinian National Council, in al-Ahram, June 9, 1974; Fahmi, in al-Ahram, Dec. 14, 1974 and Feb. 19, 1975.
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Israel in 1949-50 and to give its silent approval to a Jordanian-Israeli
settlement as long as the settlement contained provisions that Egypt
believed would contribute to the termination of the British presence
in the Nile valley. When Jordan concluded a draft treaty which ignored Egypt's interest, Egypt used the Palestinian cause to frustrate
the Jordanian-Israeli treaty. Therewith, any thought of leaving Arabism was abandoned!
With Egypt's commitment to Arab nationalism, sentiment appears to have become more effective than considerations of traditional interest. The senior statesmen of the 1940s were perhaps the
last of the traditional Egyptian nationalists. When they were turned
out in 1952, their places were taken by military officers, bureaucrats,
and opposition elements whose personal commitment to Arabism was
much more intense. The military coup in July 1952 was followed
immediately by a much greater emphasis on Arab Nationalism. In
the bitter internal struggle which lasted until 1954, no contender for
power could appear to be soft on Zionism. Under President Nasser,
Egypt's leadership of Arab nationalism became a goal in itself, while
the original connection with traditional Egyptian aspirations had
ceased to have objective existence. Indeed, the war of 1967 originated
in Nasser's reaction to a serious threat to Egypt's leadership of the
Arabs, ten years after the British had been expelled completely from
Egypt and the Sudan.
No firm forecast can be made concerning the degree to which an
Egyptian government can pursue an Egyptian interest in the face of
charges that it is betraying the Arab cause. Since 1967, the view that
Egypt's interests and Arab nationalism are not always in harmony
seems to have been winning adherents in Egypt. Since early 1974,
Egyptian statesmen have spoken to Egyptians and Arabs about
Egyptian policy in a way that for years had been unheard of. Nevertheless, more than once in the past, clamor over Palestine or Israel
has led Egyptian governments into action that they believed unwise.
Consequently, the Egyptian government still verbally conditions its
acts on the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people.
The outcome depends on how the Palestinians define their
rights. This, in turn, is conditioned by who speaks for the Palestinians. So far as Egypt and the Arab countries officially are concerned,
the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole spokesman of the
Palestinians. Thus, the goal of Egyptian and Arab policy is the PLO's
6. Dawn, Pan-Arabism and the Failure of Israeli-JordanianPeace Negotiations,
ISLAM AND ITS CULTURAL DIVERGENCE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF GUSTAVE E. VON
GRUNEBAUM 27 (G.L. Tikku ed. 1971).
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stated goal- the dismantling of the Zionist state and the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state. The Egyptians leave the
definition of the goal to the Palestinians, but the Egyptian government has not refrained from advising the Palestinians on the means.
There is general agreement that the elimination of the Zionist state
and apparatus is not achievable in a short time, but specific methods
have been subject to continuous discussion and debate.
Egypt appears to have been suggesting that the restoration of the
rights of the Palestinian people rests on the Palestinians, not Egypt.
Since 1967, there has been an implicit shift in the relative duties of
the Palestinians and the Arab states. The liberation of Palestine
remains an Arab national duty, but, in contrast to 1957-66 when
Egypt kept the Palestinians in check and emphasized the decisive
role of the regular armies, since 1968, Egypt has assigned a major role
to the Palestinian resistance. Egypt also seems to be shifting to the
Palestinians final responsibility for the satisfaction of Palestinian
claims. In response to Arab criticism of Egyptian policy, Egyptian
statesmen have been saying that there is no conflict between Egypt's
use of diplomacy to recover its occupied territories and the ultimate
recovery of Palestinian rights. The Palestinians, the Egyptians say,
are free to continue the struggle whatever the Arab states do. At the
same time, Egypt insists that it alone has the right to choose the
means of liberating Egyptian territory. Implicitly, the Egyptians retain the right to choose the means by which they will support the
Palestinians.
The Egyptians may be implicitly advising the Palestinians to try
diplomacy as well as the war of liberation. The PLO has in fact
retreated from its original insistence on a single path to liberation.
Despite the vehement denunciation of Resolution 242 and all attempts to base a solution upon it, the PLO finally, in January 1971,
very cautiously acknowledged the Arab governments' right to use
diplomacy as a legitimate means of "eliminating the consequences of
the 1967 agression." 7 Of greater importance is Egypt's success in
inducing the PLO to accept the establishment of a Palestinian state
in a part of Palestine before its total liberation. When the idea was
first suggested in late 1967, interestingly enough in the Cairo journal
al-Musawwar, s Palestinian and Arab reaction was generally intensely
hostile on the grounds that to do so would mean the acceptance of
partition and of Israel. When some Palestinian leaders and organizations began to consider the idea in 1970, Fateh and, in February 1971,
the Palestinian National Council, rejected the scheme. Finally, in
7. RECORD OF THE ARAB WORLD 282 (1971).
8. The debate in this journal has been republished in AHAMD
DAWLAH FILASTIN (Proposal for a Palestinian State, 1968).

BAHA AL-DIN, IQTIRAH
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June 1974, the PLO, by resolution of the National Council, approved
the establishment of a Palestinian government in a part of liberated
Palestine, but only as a stage in the struggle to liberate the whole of
Palestine. So the PLO, giving its approval to actions which it had for
long denounced as betrayals of Arabism, has accepted Egyptian
methods which fall short of total resistance and national struggle.
Besides inducing the PLO to accept Egyptian methods, Egypt has
given a few direct suggestions. President Sadat's recent statement
"we know with certainty that neither party to the contest has the
ability to impose a solution by force" 9 was directed at Israel, but it
covers Egypt and the Palestinians as well. Finally, Egyptian spokesmen, including President Nasser, Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal,
President Sadat, and, most recently, Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi
(December 13, 1974), have suggested that Palestinian rights are set
forth in the 1947 Partition Resolution and the 1948 resolution on
refugees, and that a permanent peace with Israel may be based on
these resolutions.
Israeli and Arab aims remain miles apart. It is extremely unlikely that Egypt, Jordan, or Syria will cede by treaty any of the
occupied territory to Israel. It may be possible, however, to devise
security arrangements and a special regime for Jerusalem which will
induce Israel to relinquish all the occupied territories. But even with
the best of arrangements for military security and with complete
satisfaction of all religious interests in Jerusalem, Israel will still
insist on tangible signs of Arab respect for the existence and territorial integrity of Israel. This point remains the great obstacle. The
Egyptian government has made final settlement dependent on satisfaction of Palestinians. The official Palestinian objective is the absorption of Israel in a Palestinian state. There would seem to be no
room for negotiation and compromise.
Nevertheless, the situation is more promising than it has ever
been, except perhaps in 1949-50. The Egyptian government is clearly
willing to recognize Israel and to conclude a treaty. For all practical
purposes, Egypt has told the Arabs that peace with Israel should be
concluded on the basis of the 1947 Partition Resolution and the 1948
resolution concerning refugees. This is obviously unacceptable to Israel, but, unlike the PLO's position, it is negotiable, Israel undoubtedly will never agree to modification of the 1949 frontiers, but some
agreement might be reached regarding the refugees, though even this
will be extremely difficult. The chief obstacle will be the Palestinians.
One can imagine Egypt signing a peace treaty with Israel as a part
of a settlement which includes transforming the PLO into the govern9. See al-Ahram, Jan. 22, 1975.
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ment of a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank. The PLO
has come to the stage that it will accept the charge, but not as a part
of a peaceful settlement with Israel. One way out might be the transfer of the West Bank and Gaza to the PLO through the Geneva
Conference or other international agency. At the same time, Egypt
and Israel would sign a formal peace treaty. Israel would then be at
peace with Egypt, and it would be left to Israel and the new Palestinian state to decide their future relations. In the initial stage, at
least, the Palestinian government would be committed to a war of
liberation and undoubtedly would strive to discharge its obligation.
Our scenario projects a series of steps, each of which is enormously difficult, and culminates in a solution which leaves Israel and
the Palestinian state in nominal war with actual hostilities likely.
Such an outcome is not likely to be viewed with favor in Israel. To
achieve this settlement, Israel would give up Israeli-occupied territory in exchange for an Egyptian pledge of peace while the Palestinians continued the war. In view of past Arab-Israeli relations, Israelis
cannot but think that at some time in the future the Egyptian governmen would once again take up the cause of the Palestinians. In short,
from the Israeli point of view, there would be no essential change. But
Israel has won no more than this by four military victories and is
unlikely to win more through future military victories. Our projected
outcome has one advantage over the past and present. Israel would
have an opportunity to develop peaceful relations with Egypt, and
perhaps other Arab countries. Under these conditions, Israel and the
Palestinian state might learn to live with each other. It may be that
the potential would not be realized, but it is nearly certain that if the
confrontation continues no peaceful relations will ever develop. A
happy outcome is uncertain, perhaps improbable, but the potential
gain is enormous. An unhappy outcome, however, might be much
more likely. The question is, how bad, from the Israeli point of view,
would the worst case be? Can anyone argue after the 1973 war that
thc Bar-Lev line was more advantageous to Israel than UNEF had
been in 1967? It may be possible to provide a security system which
would be adequate replacement for continued Israeli occupation.
If a peaceful settlement between the Arab states and Israel is
achievable, it is achievable only in stages. The first stage must be the
bringing of Israel and Egypt into an agreement over Israeli-occupied
Egyptian territory. The crucial task will be the creation of security
arrangements which will satisfy Israel sufficiently to permit Israeli
withdrawal. It is difficult to imagine how this can be achieved except
in steps extending over a period of experiment and testing. If the
effort succeeds, however, it would then be possible to tackle the tremendous political problems which remain.
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The new "interim peace agreement" between Egypt and Israel,'"
which was signed on September 4, 1975, after the foregoing part of
this article was written, is a major step in our first stage, an agreement between Egypt and Israel with respect to Israeli-occupied Egyptian territory. It is not a complete settlement of this issue, and even
less the final settlement of the political issues. The new agreement
represents, as Foreign Minister Fahmi explained when negotiations
were in the initial stage, a part of the process of military disengagement; the overall political settlement must come later, after total
Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory and the restoration of
Palestinian rights." The new agreement's provision for the opening
of the Suez Canal to Israeli non-military cargoes (Art. VII) and the
pledge to refrain from the threat or use of force or military blockade
(Art. II) might be interpreted as implying a formal peace treaty, but
these provisions, like the purely technical military arrangements
which are the only other provisions, are conditional. The agreement
has a definite term. Although it is to "remain in force until superseded by a new agreement" (Art. IX), it provides for annual extension of the UNEF mandate (Art. V), which implies annual reconsideration, and it has been widely reported that there is a private
understanding that the agreement will endure for three years. The
agreement explicitly "is not a final peace agreement" (Art. VIII [1]),
but a step toward that end (Arts. I, VIII). Implicitly, the agreement
lapses if no progress is made in realizing its goal. The new agreement
is thus even less a peace treaty than the General Armistice Agreement of 1949. What the new agreement creates is a security arrangement and a period of experiment and testing which will enable each
side to judge the intentions of the other and the willingness or desire
of its constituency to take a further step toward peace.
Nothing will be settled overnight. The Egyptian government, at
least, has decided that peace with Israel is not unthinkable. At the
same time, the Egyptian government has spoken with extreme caution and ambiguity lest it go farther than Arab nationalist sentiment
in Egypt will tolerate. In the past, Egyptian governments have taken
action against their better judgment when Palestinian Arabs have
sounded the call. Leadership among the Palestinians has passed to
those who will risk speaking to Arabs about a Palestine in which all
Jews now in the land will live in equality, but the Palestinian leadership totally rejects a Jewish entity in Palestine and even its conception of the future Palestine is not assured of majority support. Recon10. The text of the agreement appears elsewhere in this issue, and is also found
in the N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1975, at 16, col. 1.
11. See Fahmi's statement in al-Ahram, Feb. 19, 1975.
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ciliation between Israelis and Palestinian Arabs can develop only over
the long run, and until it is achieved no Arab government can feel
secure in office.

